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ABSTRACT 
While it may seem that genomic innovations recently burst upon the scene but they have actually 
been taking place since the early 1970s. Genomic research in microbes, animals, plants and 
humans have all triggered intrigue and controversy.  This is perhaps best known in the field of 
plant sciences with the development of genetically modified plants and their resulting products. 
However, human genomic research, especially relating to disease research, has triggered its own 
share of debate. 
 
Private firms undertaking biotechnology research on human diseases have invented a range of 
testing procedures and, in some cases, the patenting of these test procedures based upon 
individual human genes. Myriad Genetics has been involved in research on breast cancer.  After 
the identification of two genes that coded for the presence of breast cancer in women, Myriad 
filled for, and received, patents in the United States and Canada for the breast cancer diagnostic 
test that the firm developed. Canadian provinces utilized this diagnostic test as part of the testing 
procedures for women and all was fine until Myriad started to enforce the patents rights on the 
test, which meant that all samples would need to be sent to Myriad’s laboratories at much higher 
cost to the Canadian provinces using this test. 
 
The enforcement of patent rights is well within the law, but it was the enforcement of patent 
rights on a human gene patent that triggered considerable consternation. What was revealed to 
those interested in genomic research and the related aspects of this research, was the apparent 
conflict between the Canada Health Act and the Canadian Patent Act. While the Canada Health 
Act guarantees equal treatment for all Canadians, the ability for private firms to profit from basic 
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health procedures, established the need for a fundamental review of this situation. Canadian 
health and genomic researchers were not alone in this review.  Most industrial nations were part 
of this debate and dialogue process. The result was that the world’s industrialized nations agreed 
to develop guidelines for the patenting of testing procedures for human diseases.  
 
Canada faces a policy quandary with the competing objectives of a publicly funded accessible 
and universal healthcare system and the right to a return on private investment from intellectual 
property and other rights associated with patents. The Canadian healthcare system and the 
delivery of services are based on innovative technologies. These innovative technologies have 
been patented and firms and investors expect a return on their investment. This thesis examines 
the conflict that Myriad created within Canada when it began to enforce their patent rights. In 
essence, what it examines is the right to profit from an innovative discovery and technology and 
how to balance that against the regulatory requirement to ensure that Canadians continue to get 
the best healthcare service possible.  
 
Canadian policy makers face a choice of policy instruments to resolve this quandary through the 
implementation of the OECD Guidelines for Licensing of Genetic Inventions.  This thesis also 
explores the implementation issues and feasibility of the choices of policy instruments for 
implementation of the OECD Guidelines and concludes that the soft law policy instrument is the 
most optimal choice for implementation of the Guidelines. 
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CHAPTER ONE 
INNOVATION AND GENOMICS 
 
 
1.1 Introduction 
Innovative discoveries in genetics research have fundamentally challenged the patent legislation 
of many, if not most, industrial jurisdictions. Patent acts in Europe and North America were 
written to provide protection for inanimate objects. Patents are a legal construct designed to 
provide incentives to create investment in research and development and knowledge-based 
industries. Patent owners receive a monopoly over the invention for a defined period of time and 
an avenue for legal recourse against those who use the invention without authority to do so. In 
return for those rights, patent owners agree to disclose information regarding their research or 
invention to the public. 
 
Patent acts were developed prior to the genetics revolution and are thus open to broad 
interpretations regarding patent applications on living life forms. Opponents argued that patent 
acts were developed with the intention that living matter should not be patentable, while 
proponents argued that while there was nothing explicitly allowing life forms to be patented, the 
drafters of those acts did not want to prohibit innovation and thereby purposely made the 
legislation open to broad interpretation.  
 
The patenting of plants began in the 1930s with the enactment of the Plant Patent Act in the 
United States.  Patenting of living life forms involving microorganisms began in the 1970s but 
rapidly progressed into further applications involving plants and animals in the 1980s. The 
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patentability of lower life forms has evolved to the point that it now seeks to reach the pinnacle 
of higher life forms. This evolution began in 1980 with the United States ruling in Diamond v. 
Chakrabarty, continued into 1982 with the Canadian decision in the Application of Abitibi Co., 
encompassing the 1999 European decision of the Enlarged Board of Appeal in Novartis and 
concluding to date with the rulings on the Harvard/Onco-mouse applications (Kaminski et al., 
2005). Patents on lower life forms (single cell microorganisms) initially taxed patent offices in 
both North America and Europe during this period of time. 
 
While the legal evolution of life form patenting has provided inventors with the ability to patent 
genetic innovations, ongoing discussions and debates regarding patent rights continue to 
highlight some recurring concerns. Such concerns include freedom-to-operate, research 
exemptions, economic return on investment analysis, timely access to information, monopolistic 
opportunities and whether or not future research is fostered or impeded through the use of 
patents. Phillips (2007) stated that concerns regarding the use of intellectual property rights 
(IPRs) and patents revolved around the need to review, with a potential solution to amend, the 
intellectual property system. However, at its workshop in Berlin in January 2002, the 
Organisation for Economic Co-operation and Development (OECD) concluded that the 
intellectual property system largely serves the purpose for which it was created when analyzing 
the intellectual property system specifically for the purposes of biotechnology and genetics 
research (OECD, 2006). 
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1.2 Problem Statement 
The OECD has stated that the patent system serves its purpose relative to biotechnology and 
genetic innovations; however, the issues and concerns surrounding the commercialization of 
intellectual property, from which patents are a stream, remain. Commercialization of patents 
deals with the generation of use and therefore the value of patents. In response to these concerns, 
the OECD brought forward its ‘Guidelines for the Licensing of Genetic Inventions’ in 2006. The 
intent of the Guidelines was to suggest how to best generate use and enhance value of intellectual 
property – how to aid commercialization of patents – through the licensing of genetic inventions. 
 
Gold (2006) presented implementation options of the Guidelines in the Canadian patent system 
at Health Canada’s Human Genetics Licensing Symposium. These options include the following 
implementation approaches: hard law; soft law; institutional; and educational. The question that 
remains to be answered is: What implementation option or options of the Guidelines most 
effectively address the issues and concerns surrounding the generation and use of patents on 
genetic inventions? 
 
1.3      Objective of Study 
Canada faces a policy quandary with the competing objectives of a publicly funded accessible 
and universal healthcare system and the right to a return on private investment from intellectual 
property and other rights associated with patents. The Canadian healthcare system and the 
delivery of services are based on innovative technologies. These innovative technologies have 
been patented and firms and investors expect a return on their investment. Canadian policy 
makers face a choice of policy instruments to resolve this quandary through the implementation 
4 
 
of the OECD Guidelines for Licensing of Genetic Inventions. This thesis explores the 
implementation issues and feasibility of the choices of policy instruments for implementation of 
the OECD Guidelines and concludes that the soft law policy instrument is the most optimal 
choice for implementation of the Guidelines. 
 
The specific objectives of the study are: 
i) to review the theoretical underpinnings of the policy issues and concerns surrounding the 
commercialization of patents in biotechnology and genetics research; 
ii) to present the case of Myriad Genetics and the enforcement of their patent rights on the 
BRCA1 and BRCA2 genes;  
iii) to summarize the OECD Guidelines; 
iv) to apply the policy framework created for implementing the OECD Guidelines and to 
provide a discussion regarding the choices of policy instruments for implementation of the 
Guidelines; and 
v) to summarize the choices of policy instruments based on feasibility and to suggest best 
choice implementation options for the OECD Guidelines. 
 
1.4      Organization of the Study 
This study is organized into seven chapters. Chapter Two provides a literature review of the 
policy issues and concerns surrounding the commercialization of patents in biotechnology and 
genetics research. Chapter Three provides the theoretical insights regarding the health and 
innovation policy framework in Canada. Chapter Four provides the background to Myriad 
Genetics’ enforcement of their intellectual property rights for the BRCA1 and BRCA2 genes and 
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highlights the policy issues and concerns that resulted. Chapter Five provides a detailed overview 
of the OECD Guidelines. Chapter Six applies the policy framework articulated in Chapter Three 
to analyze the potential effect the OECD Guidelines may have had on Myriad. Chapter Seven 
offers concluding thoughts, presenting a summary of the results, limitations and extensions to 
future research.  
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CHAPTER TWO 
THEORY AND LITERATURE REVIEW 
 
2.1     Introduction 
The concept of health and health delivery has evolved. Health has come to be defined by so 
much more than the simple interaction between doctor and patient or contained within a hospital; 
it is a multi-faceted institution that encompasses citizens, doctors and researchers, governments, 
innovative technologies and the environment. Health delivery has the potential to be significantly 
affected by the role of innovative technologies upon health. The Canadian Biotechnology 
Advisory Committee (CBAC, 2004) suggested that a health innovation can be "… a new or 
improved product, service or method [that] is introduced and used in the course of providing 
health care to individuals, or in the course of organizing, managing and delivering health services 
from a population/public health perspective." This perspective of health clearly extends well 
beyond the conventional perception of health encompassing only the standard doctor/patient 
relationship. 
 
The application of a new innovation to society must be accompanied by appropriate intellectual 
property protection mechanisms to provide the developers of the technology with the capacity 
and freedom to operate that is necessary to take new innovations forward for society's benefit. 
This is needed in order to serve the purpose of patent legislation by encouraging further research 
and development. This concept is relatively straightforward and openly accepted by societies 
when it comes to physical products (i.e. electronics); however, when it comes to the 
advancement, protection and commercialization of knowledge related to human genetics or more 
specifically, human genes, society gets very nervous, very quickly.  
7 
 
The relationship between human gene patents and the protection of intellectual property (IP) in 
this field of research serves to broaden the traditional concept of health. While patents in the 
health sector are not a new concept as it is commonplace for new drugs or diagnostic tools to be 
patented, what is new is that the human genes that are essential in diagnostic testing and disease 
treatment can be patented. Presently, human gene patents create complexity regarding freedom to 
operate. The lack of freedom to operate at the research level can create hold-ups for the 
commercialization of new technologies involved in the diagnostic testing and treatment of 
human diseases. As a result, researchers are uncertain over the effects that human gene patents 
will have on the future delivery of health services. 
 
Considerable literature is available on the issues and concerns with the patent system. Some 
authors have opined that the system needs to be completely discarded or substantially revised 
(Scherer 2002, Siebrasse undated, Paradise et al., 2005).  Others have argued that the system is 
fine (Gold et al., 2007) and that it is the management within the system that needs changing. Yet 
others have presented positions that perhaps a hybrid of a change in the legislation and a change 
in management is required. The OECD (2006) has determined that the patent system itself is 
effective for the purposes for which it was created; however, it acknowledges that there remain 
issues and concerns surrounding the patenting and licensing of genetic innovations.   
 
The patenting of living life forms began in the 1970s involving microorganisms, but rapidly 
progressed into applications involving plants and animals in the 1980s. The patentability of 
lower life forms evolved to the point that it has now reached the pinnacle of higher life forms. 
This evolution began in 1980 with the United States ruling in Diamond v. Chakrabarty, 
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continued into 1982 with the Canadian decision in the Application of Abitibi Co. and concluding 
to date with the rulings on the Harvard/Onco-mouse applications.  Each of these decisions builds 
upon its predecessor and illustrates the differing mindsets and considerations of the legal systems 
present in individual jurisdictions in adjudicating a patent application. 
 
Table 2.1 shows that the various jurisdictions dealt with these initial applications in vastly 
differing amounts of time. This is especially evident when comparing the process of approving 
the Harvard mouse across the two jurisdictions. 
 
Table 2.1: Relevant Decisions in Life Form Patenting 
CASE JURISDICTION YEAR OF FILING YEAR OF FINAL RULING 
Chakrabarty United States 1972 1980 
Abitibi Co. Canada 1976 1982 
Harvard/Onco-mouse United States 1984 1988 
Harvard/Onco-mouse Canada 1985 2002 
 
The following section examines the precedent setting cases in the jurisdictions of Canada and the 
US. In both of these jurisdictions, the case that is presented was the initial living life form patent 
application case that opened the way for all subsequent life form patents. By comparing each of 
the two jurisdictional cases, it is possible to see the similarities and differences in each decision. 
 
2.2 United States - Diamond, Commissioner of Patents and Trademarks v. Chakrabarty 
In 1972, the Respondent, Chakrabarty, filed a patent application for a genetically engineered 
microorganism that degraded multiple components of crude oil and was therefore conceptually 
very valuable to the treatment of oil spills. The ability of this artificially-made bacterium to break 
down crude oil was not found in naturally occurring bacteria and was therefore treated as a 
newly created composition of matter. Within the 36 patent claims, Chakrabarty brought forward 
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three types of claims: the process to create the bacteria; the inocula to carry the bacteria on 
water; and the bacteria itself. The patent examiner accepted the claims for the process and for the 
inoculums but rejected the claim for the bacteria citing that microorganisms are products of 
nature and are living things and are therefore excluded from patentability under Title 35 U.S.C. 
101. 
 
Upon appeal, the Patent Office Board of Appeals reaffirmed the rejection on the grounds that the 
subject matter constitutes a living thing and that living things are not patentable subject matter 
under 35 U.S.C. 101. This decision was reversed by the Court of Customs and Patent Appeals 
who adjudged that “the fact that micro-organisms are alive is without legal significance for the 
purposes of patent law.” 
 
Upon final appeal, the issue presented to the US Supreme Court was for the court to provide its 
perception or legal understanding of Title 35 U.S.C. 101, which states: 
 
Whoever invents or discovers any new and useful process, machine, manufacture, 
or composition of matter, or any new and useful improvement thereof, may obtain 
a patent therefore, subject to the conditions and requirements of this title. 
 
More specifically, the Court felt it was required to define the terms ‘manufacture’ and 
‘composition of matter’ as they appear in the statute based on their intended purpose and their 
usual, common meaning. Further, the Court determined that the use of expansive terms such as 
'any new and useful …. manufacture, or composition of matter …' clearly indicated that the 
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patent laws should be given broad scope. As such, the Respondent’s microorganism was held to 
be patentable matter. 
 
The Petitioner, The Commissioner of Patents and Trademarks, put forth two arguments both of 
which were rejected by the Supreme Court. Firstly, the Petitioner argued that the micro-
organisms were excluded from patentability as they were living organisms and the presence of 
the 1930 Plant Patent Act and the 1970 Plant Variety Protection Act provide evidence that 
Congress did not intend for living things to be patentable under the Patent Act. This argument 
was not found to be persuasive. The enactment of the 1930 Plant Patent Act was done to address 
two concerns regarding the patentability of plants: that all plants were excluded from 
patentability as natural products; and that plants were not patentable because differentiation was 
difficult, if not impossible, to obtain in the written description requirement of a patent. Such 
concerns were addressed in the Act wherein it states that the work of a plant breeder is patentable 
and through the relaxing of the written description requirements for such patentable plants. The 
1970 Plant Variety Protection Act extended the protection afforded by the 1930 Act for true-to-
type reproduction of plants. Further, there is no exclusion for the patentability of bacteria in 
either Act. The enactment of these two Acts does not indicate that Congress intended for living 
organisms to be excluded from patentability under referenced patent legislation. 
 
The second argument put forward by the Petitioner stated that the unforeseen development of 
genetic technology was excluded from patentability because Congress could not possibly have 
intended for this to be included as there was no pre-existing knowledge that such products could 
be created. The Court ruled that while the sociological arguments put forth in the brief filed by 
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the Petitioner illustrate some valuable concerns, it is not the job of the Courts to augment societal 
concerns into its role in determining what the law is in areas of perceived ambiguity. Further, the 
Court states that there is no area of ambiguity in the patent legislation; there are merely broad 
terms which are required to obtain the objectives of Congress which, in this case, is to allow for 
the patentability of unforeseeable inventions. It is the position of the Court that subject matter 
that is not expressly included in patent legislation as patentable is not deemed as excluded from 
patentability on that basis alone.  
 
It is important to note that the ruling in Diamond v. Chakrabarty is very narrow and was based 
on the artificial content of the bacterium. The Court clearly stated that while the bacterium was a 
living organism it was not a natural life form and, more importantly, that the relevant distinction 
for patentability was between products of nature and man-made products and not living versus 
inanimate things. Chakrabarty received patent protection upon the ruling of the US Supreme 
Court in 1980, eight years from its initial filing date in 1972. 
 
 
2.3 Canada - Abitibi Co.  
Abitibi Co. applied for a patent on June 16, 1976 for its assigned microbial yeast culture created 
from domestic sewage. Such sewage is modified to create spent sulfite waste liquor which is then 
used to digest sulfite waste liquor from pulp plants thereby allowing the effluent to be disposed 
of without contamination of the waste system. Value to the culture is enhanced as a result of its 
ability to purify foaming wastes. The culture was found to be able to recreate itself on spent 
sulfite liquor ensuring the continued supply of the product. The process claims of creating the 
culture were allowed by the patent examiner; however, the examiner rejected two claims on the 
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basis that the culture is a living thing and is therefore excluded from patentability under Section 
2 of the Canada Patent Act. 
 
Relying on the ruling provided in Chakrabarty, the Applicant claimed that the culture is a man-
made product and therefore falls within the realm of the definition of ‘manufacture’ and 
‘composition of matter’. Abitibi further submitted that if a process is patentable for the creation 
of a living organism, the creation or living organism itself should therefore be patentable as well. 
 
Precedent setting decisions in Germany, Australia, Canada and the United States illustrate that 
judicial bodies have broadened the scope of the legislation for patentable subject matter to 
encompass new developments and emerging technologies. As such, the Patent Appeal Board 
could not with certainty believe that the Canadian courts would not allow the patentability of a 
microorganism. This is the satisfying criterion for Section 42 of the Act. 
 
Section 36 of the Act requires that for a product to be patentable the inventor must be able to 
describe the creation of same such that it can be duplicated by any member of the public 
schooled in the art or science under which the product was invented. In this case, the Board held 
that such section has been satisfied given that the microorganism can reproduce itself in the 
described medium at a level that is sustainable to supply the public the microorganism into the 
future and upon expiration of the rights granted under the patent. 
 
The Board held that the microbial yeast culture satisfied the criteria necessary to meet the test of 
patentability and provided its recommendation that the rejections be withdrawn. Upon review of 
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the findings, the Commissioner concurred and remanded the application to the examiner for 
execution. From the date of filing, June 16, 1976, to the date of final adjudication by the Patent 
Appeal Board, March 18, 1982, it took just under six years for Abitibi to secure its patent. 
 
The significance of the ruling of the Board in Abitibi is seen in its summary review of case 
precedence from several jurisdictions and in its deviation from the historical practices of the 
Canadian Patent Office. Past practices of the Patent Office were to narrowly define patentability 
of lower and higher life forms such that a general ruling was that higher life forms were excluded 
from patentability. In its ruling, the Board provided a clear outline of the criteria for patentability 
of living things. Holding to Section 36, the inventor must provide a description of the method of 
production clearly and concisely to allow for future reproduction; this is done through the ability 
of the microbial yeast culture to reproduce itself upon the creation of the medium. The medium 
for reproduction must therefore be well articulated to be afforded patent rights and be 
reproducible. Further, the organism must be a new and useful invention and not merely a 
stepping stone for further research. Such organism must also possess traits that are significantly 
different from any known species to satisfy the requirement for inventive ingenuity.  
 
 
2.4 Cross Jurisdictional Comparison 
Harvard College applied for a patent for a ‘transgenic mouse’ whose genes had been modified by 
the induction of the oncogene into a fertilized mouse egg in its early stages of development. The 
modified egg is then planted in the female mouse whose offspring are then born and tested for 
the presence of the oncogene. Founder mice are created in this fashion and are categorized based 
on the presence of the oncogene. These mice are then mated with unchanged mice. It is the 
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offspring of this coupling who present the existence of the oncogene that are suitable for use in 
cancer research. Harvard College filed the same patent application in the US and Canada. 
 
2.4.1 Harvard/Onco-mouse – US Decision 
On June 22, 1984, Harvard College filed a patent application for a patent on a higher life form. 
The product claims of the application were for transgenic, non-human mammals whose cells 
contain the oncogene sequence as introduced into such mammal or any ancestor of such 
mammal. Specific claim was made for the ‘transgenic mouse’. Process claims consisted of the 
method of creating the transgenic cell culture and induction into the mammal, the method of 
testing for the presence of carcinogens in the transgenic mammals, the method of testing matter 
believed to cause the formation of malignant tumors and various claims relating to the cell 
cultures and plasmids of the transgenic mammals (Garland and Smordin, 2003). 
 
The 1980 ruling in Diamond v. Chakrabarty, as outlined above, provided the legal basis upon 
which Harvard College was successful in obtaining acceptance of its patent application for the 
transgenic mammals in the United States (Ramlall, 2003). The main premise of the Chakrabarty 
ruling is the distinction of man-made versus naturally developed products. 
 
With the ruling in 1988, the patent application process concluded and afforded Harvard College 
their patent protection benefits four years after the initial date of filing. 
 
15 
 
2.4.2 Harvard College v. Canada (Commissioner for Patents)  
Harvard College’s Canadian patent application was filed on June 21, 1985 entitled 'Transgenic 
Animals' and, once again, encompassing the product and process claims as contained in the 
corresponding US patent application filed in 1984 and outlined above. 
 
All of the product claims, those claims relating to the onco-mouse in and of itself, were rejected 
upon examination by the Patent Office based on the determination that the onco-mouse was not 
an 'invention' as defined by the Patent Act: “any new and useful art, process, machine, 
manufacture or composition of matter, or any new and useful improvement in any art, process, 
machine, manufacture or composition of matter”. The Examiner further noted that there is a lack 
of precedence for the patentability of higher life forms. The 1982 ruling in Abitibi allows for the 
patenting of lower life forms; however, the Patent Appeal Board noted in its ruling in Abitibi that 
the patenting of higher life forms would require further debate and consideration. Also 
referenced was the ruling in Pioneer Hi-Bred wherein the Commissioner of Patents adjudged 
that the product did not fall within the definition of 'invention' pursuant to the Act (Garland and 
Smordin, 2003). The process claims contained in the onco-mouse application were accepted by 
the Examiner. 
 
In its ruling of August 1995 on the appeal, the Commissioner of Patents noted that the Supreme 
Court in Pioneer did not rule on the definition of inventions but rejected the claim on the basis of 
insufficient disclosure. The Commissioner separated the subject matter into two phases and 
found that the inventor could control the creation of the plasmid (phase one) but not the final 
mouse (phase two), the offspring of the host mouse, which is produced through the laws of 
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nature. This finding was qualified by the position of the Commissioner that the terms 
‘manufacture’ and ‘composition of matter’ are items that are controlled by the inventor (Garland 
and Smordin, 2003). Such findings resulted in the Commissioner for Patents reaffirming the 
ruling of the Patent Examiner. 
 
Review of the case by the Federal Court Trial Division resulted in the appeal being dismissed 
and the decision of the reaffirmation of the decision of the Commissioner. Following in the next 
step of the appeal process brought the matter to the Federal Court of Appeal. Summarily, the 
Federal Court of Appeal reversed the decision of the Trial Division and directed the 
Commissioner to accept the product claims of the onco-mouse patent application. After 17 years 
of debate within the Canadian legal system, in 2002, the Supreme Court of Canada overturned 
the Federal Court of Appeal ruling with a 5-4 majority decision and with finality determined that 
the Harvard/Onco-mouse is not patentable in Canada. Interestingly, the Court ruled in favour of 
the claims for patenting the process to create the onco-mouse and the genes involved in this 
process, but the living life form was rejected. 
 
The significance of the Chakrabarty decision lies in the ruling setting the basis for the patenting 
of a living organism which is considered to be a lower life form. This decision and the mindset 
of the Court in reaching same served to set the premise upon which the US Patent & Trademark 
Office granted Harvard College the patent on the onco-mouse. Of particular interest is the 
approach of distinguishing that the issue at hand was not that of a lower versus higher life form 
but was that of a man-made versus nature created subject matter. The Court surmised that it was 
not relevant that the invention was a living organism; what was relevant was if it was in fact an 
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invention pursuant to the terms of the Act requiring that an invention be manufactured and be a 
composition of matter. Utilizing this mindset going forward, we can see some clear distinctions 
that can be drawn when determining patentability. If man’s intervention is required to create the 
product and such product could not be created without man’s intervention such a product should 
therefore be deemed patentable, all other conditions of patentability having been met, 
notwithstanding the living or non-living state of such product. 
 
While both the Federal Court of Appeal and the Supreme Court in Canada have stated that social 
policy debates have no place in determining the patentability of the onco-mouse, it is interesting 
to note that the Supreme Court makes a notation that to patent the subject matter would be akin 
to patenting a higher life form which would be a contentious issue and outside of the scope of 
traditional practice of the Canadian Patent Office. 
 
In the US, a positive evolution has taken place in the patenting of lower and higher life forms, 
where there has been progression in the influential decisions as they have come forward over the 
past 25 years. Canada began its evolution with the Abitibi decision and, at first glance, appears to 
have ceased such progress by its final ruling on the Harvard/Onco-mouse application. 
 
Is that truly the case though? Has the ability to protect higher life forms in Canada been 
circumvented by the Harvard mouse ruling? The Supreme Court ruling in the Monsanto v. 
Schmeiser case provides for what is being termed as practical patent protection (Ogilvy Renault, 
2003). Monsanto claimed the chimeric gene and the plant cells that contained such gene in its 
patent application and did not make claim to the transgenic plant itself. The infringement ruling 
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against Schmeiser was valid based on the reproduction of the chimeric gene and the plant cells 
containing such genes as they were present in Schmeiser’s crops. At the time of the filing of the 
Harvard mouse application and its subsequent ruling, it was not technologically possible to 
monitor the presence of a gene at the single cell level. This is exactly the process that has been 
utilized in confirming the existence of the protected product in the Monsanto v. Schmeiser case.  
When dealing with transgenic life forms, whether higher or lower, practical patent protection can 
be obtained by claiming the specified gene and the cells of the organism containing such gene 
(Ogilvy Renault, 2003). 
 
While the US has granted the patenting of higher life forms, with the exception of human beings, 
Canada has not done so, per se. Canada does, however, have protective mechanisms in its 
present legislation to afford very practical protection with the equivalent result as is obtained in 
the US.   
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CHAPTER THREE 
ANALYTICAL FRAMEWORK 
 
3.1     Introduction 
This section provides a concise contrast of the governance frameworks relating to patenting of 
higher life forms. The key elements of the governance framework are: statutory (legal); 
economic; and regulatory (Figure 3.1). These three aspects are finally contrasted with the OECD 
Guidelines relating to the patenting of genetic inventions.  
 
Figure 3.1: Identifying Issues and Concerns with Present Patent System 
 
 
 
*Not focus of topic of thesis therefore culled. 
 
 
3.2 Statutory/Legal 
Discussions and debates regarding IPRs, and more specifically patent rights, highlight some 
recurring concerns. These topics are presented above and have been discussed at length at many 
levels of government and within both public and private organizations. Concerns regarding the 
use of IPRs and patents revolved around the need to review, with a potential solution to amend, 
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the IP system (Phillips, 2007). While the above concerns are present in all industries within 
which IPRs and patents are utilized, the debate becomes more contentious when considering 
these matters within the context of biotechnology and genetics research. One of the objectives of 
an IP system is to foster research and development by providing an opportunity to earn a return 
on a research investment. The dollar investment in biotechnology and genetics research is 
extensive and it is through these research areas that a significant contribution is being made to 
enhancing human health and the delivery of healthcare services (OECD, 2006). As a result, it is 
relevant to ask and seek to determine if Canada’s health policy and IP system are complimentary 
and if the objectives of each of these systems are being met within the confines or operations of 
the other. This opens up the discussions on patent rights and their effect on health and healthcare 
services – an ongoing, controversial discussion within the ranks of government and society in 
both developed and developing countries. 
 
The following summary of the Canada Health Act (1984) and the Patent Act (1985) of Canada, 
highlight areas of potential conflict between the two Acts. Following this, the section will 
summarize the OECD’s ‘Guidelines for Licensing of Genetic Inventions’ and proposed 
implementation approaches presented at the Health Canada Symposium held in Vancouver in 
March 2006.   
 
3.2.1 The Canada Health Act 
There are five criteria contained in the Canada Health Act that must be adhered to by the 
provinces in order to qualify for the full annual cash contribution that the federal government 
provides to each province with regard to healthcare spending. Each of these criteria has its own 
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level of importance within discussions surrounding biotechnology and genetic innovations and 
their contribution to health and the delivery of healthcare in Canada. These five criteria are:  
public administration; comprehensiveness; universality; portability; and accessibility. The 
following three are relevant to this paper. 
 
Comprehensiveness within the Canada Health Act requires that the provinces “must insure all 
insured healthcare services provided by hospitals, medical practitioners or dentists,” and where 
the law of a province dictates, any other such service provided by any other healthcare 
professional. A provincial government cannot arbitrarily refuse to pay for or insure an insured 
service that is defined as an insured service pursuant to the Act and any relevant provincial laws.  
The Canada Health Act defines an insured health service as “hospital services, physician 
services and surgical-dental services provided to insured persons.” This definition does not 
include those health services that are provided under other forms of legislation such as workers’ 
compensation. This criterion provides a minimum standard of insured care that is available to all 
residents of a province. 
 
Universality requires that each and every person defined as a resident of a province be entitled to 
the same insured health services provided under the provincial insured health plan on the same 
terms and conditions. The goal of this criterion is to remove financial barriers to access of 
medical services and to assist in setting the base standard of healthcare to be provided to all 
residents of a province. 
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Accessibility deals primarily with ensuring that all insured persons are not restricted from 
reasonable access to insured health services for as a result of any charges for such services.  
Adherence to this criterion also requires that the province provide reasonable compensation to 
healthcare providers and hospitals for the provision of insured health services. The objective of 
this clause is to remove the financial barrier that may be present to residents of a province in 
order to obtain access to insured health services. 
 
In summary, the Canada Health Act seeks to provide a uniform system of healthcare across the 
board to all Canadians regardless of race, gender, province of residence or socio-economic 
status. It seeks to provide equality and eliminate any opportunity for discrimination of any type 
within the healthcare system in Canada. 
 
3.2.2 The Patent Act1 
The Patent Act of Canada provides patentees, those entitled to the benefits of a patent, “the 
exclusive right, privilege and liberty of making, constructing and using the invention and selling 
it to others to be used.” In order to obtain these patent rights, an application for an invention must 
be made to the Commissioner of Patents and must contain a specification of the subject matter.  
Specification is a detailed description of the invention and how it is used, how the invention is 
created or made such that any person skilled in the art or science from which the invention is 
created could replicate same. Should the subject matter of a patent be a process, the specification 
portion of the application must include the required sequence of steps specific to the subject 
                                                          
1
 This review of the Patent Act of Canada is not exhaustive in nature but is specific to the sections of such legislation 
that are relevant to the discussion topic of this thesis. 
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matter. The specification must be completed with the statement of a claim or claims that clearly 
defines the subject matter of the invention for which the patent rights are being sought. 
 
Under the Act, for an invention to be defined as patentable it must not be previously disclosed to 
the public and must be novel and useful. Section 28.2 of the Act states that the subject matter of 
a patent application must not be public information more than one year before the filing date of 
the application. The filing date of an application is the date upon which the Commissioner 
receives the patent application and any required supporting documents and fees. The novelty of 
an invention is defined in Section 28.3 of the Act and requires that the subject matter of a patent 
application not be obvious to a person skilled in the art or science of the industry in which the 
subject matter is contained. 
 
Section 19 of the Patent Act states that the Commissioner can authorize the use of a patent by 
either a federal or provincial government subject under the following criteria: 
i) That the subject matter of the patent be used to supply the domestic market; 
ii) That the government pay for the use of such patent based on a fair and equitable economic 
valuation; and 
iii) That efforts were made to obtain the use of such patent from the patentee on “reasonable 
commercial terms” and that such efforts were unsuccessful except in the case of a national 
emergency or urgency or where use of the patent is sought for public non-profit use. 
 
Section 32 of the Act provides for the patentability of improvements made to existing patents.  
This section also requires that the researcher or inventor obtain proper authorization for the 
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original patent or patents and that only such improvements be the subject matter of the new 
patent application. 
 
3.3 Economic 
Phillips (2007) provides a discussion of four reasons for economic resistance regarding patenting 
and intellectual property rights: generating investment debate; freedom to operate concerns; 
monopolistic opportunities; and return on investment. 
 
3.3.1 Generating Investment 
Intellectual property rights were designed to provide economic incentives for private business to 
invest in research and development and knowledge-based industries (Jackson, 2003; Caulfield, et 
al., 2004). Patents are one form of IPRs that provide the owner of a patent a monopoly over the 
invention for a defined period of time and an avenue for legal recourse against those who use the 
invention without authority to do so (Jackson, 2003; Caulfield, et al., 2004). In return for those 
rights, patent owners in Canada agree to share their information with the public to work towards 
government’s goal of inciting further research and development (Jackson, 2003). Phillips states 
that the evidence supporting the need for patents in order to generate ongoing private investment 
in research and development is contested, opining that a stronger argument is whether or not 
patenting is required for private investment in commercialization of products or innovations in 
biotechnology. He further opines that many biotechnological inventions that reach the market are 
pharmaceutical in nature, coming from non-commercial programs but incurring large regulatory 
and development costs. 
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The investment debate increased in intensity post the Supreme Court of Canada’s ruling on the 
Onco-mouse patent application. Phillips posits that one side of the debate resulted from the 
perception that the rejection of the product claim in the patent application put Canada at a 
disadvantage with other competing countries in the biotechnology industry since the rejection 
would have a negative effect on private investment in research and development in Canada. 
Others have argued that the ruling would promote other forms of, and investment in, alternative 
methods of research. Neither of these arguments has been supported by empirical evidence to 
date.   
 
Investment into research provides the financial wherewithal to conduct the research; however the 
next argument in the debate on patenting life forms is the restrictiveness of further research 
based on granted patents and the need for licenses and agreements in order to build upon 
protected research. This restrictiveness refers to freedom to operate concerns. 
 
3.3.2 Freedom to Operate 
Vast uses of gene sequences in biotechnology makes it exceedingly difficult to clearly determine 
the specific terms of a gene patent. At the time of development and patenting, it is unknown what 
the future uses of a gene sequence will be and, in the absence of substitutable products, it 
becomes virtually impossible to define the terms of a patent resulting in a greater breadth to the 
terms of the patent itself. The breadth of patent claims further reduces opportunity for research 
and development based on the initial gene sequence as it would most often result in patent 
infringement. This particular concern varies in degree based on the position of the owner of the 
patent – whether or not the owner is adverse to patent infringement litigation or not (Caulfield, et 
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al., 2004; Jackson, 2003). Such breadth of patents and the lack of explicit research exemptions in 
patent systems create freedom to operate concerns. 
 
Phillips states that while research exemptions do not exist in patent systems, many public 
universities and institutes are undertaking their research using private IP without a license.  The 
problem with operating without a license and conducting further research is the impediment 
created to commercializing that research given the unauthorized use of IP. Phillips opines further 
that a research exemption may not address this concern as exemptions do not provide a method 
for negotiating a commercialization contract and would likely lead to strategic bargaining and 
result in a loss of sunk costs. A more appropriate model would be the use of research licenses 
which would contain provisions for negotiating subsequent operational licenses (Phillips, 2007). 
 
Research hold-ups are known to exist and with the increase in the breadth and depth of the patent 
pool, there is increased concern as to whether hold-ups are on the rise. Recent research from the 
agricultural side of the biotechnology industry examine the issue of hold-ups in some detail 
(Dierker and Phillips, 2003, Galushko et al., 2010; Smyth and Gray, 2011). The authors identify 
that hold-ups in agricultural biotechnology research have developed in the past 20 years, but that 
innovative strategies have been implemented by the various firms to address the situation. The 
suggestion appears to be that the hold-ups that develop in an industry are tolerated at the lower 
levels, but once the inability to have large degrees of freedom to operate, the industry repositions 
itself in such a way that it tries to resolve the barriers to innovation as best as possible. 
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The restricted use of a patented innovation provides patent holders with monopolistic 
opportunities in the market place resulting in the third reason discussed in this paper for 
economic resistance. 
 
3.3.3 Monopolistic Opportunities 
Patent protection provides patent holders with the right to a monopoly over the use of the 
patented product or innovation. This monopolistic position gives inventors the opportunity to 
restrict supply of their product in the market thereby resulting in higher prices to consumers and 
higher profits to the inventors (Phillips, 2007).  
 
In a competitive marketplace, firms are allowed to price discriminate, but at their own peril. If a 
firm drastically overcharges for a product, it can serve to undermine the success of the product as 
consumers will decide that the perceived benefits are not justified by the pricing strategy. 
Additionally, if the potential for profits is substantial, other firms will discover ways and means 
of inventing around a specific patent and thereby providing competitive products to the market. 
Increased competition is the biggest economic fear that monopolistic firms have as they prefer to 
price such that other firms will not desire to enter the market, yet that consumers are not 
complaining about the price of the product and demanding the introduction of competitive 
products.   
 
3.3.4 Return on Investment 
Gene or life form patenting is more complex than traditional technological patents because of the 
hybrid of both technology and information within a gene sequence (Jackson, 2003).  Information 
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contained in the same gene sequence can be used for pharmaceutical development, in areas of 
diagnostic testing for diseases, in target drug formation and a few other areas (Ibid.). Each area 
requires additional investment to pursue research post the identification of the gene sequence in 
and of itself. Identifying the protein content of a gene is a very costly venture and patenting is 
required to attract investors to empower biotech and knowledge-based industries and to elicit 
further investment that is required to protect the IPRs of investors (Ibid.). 
 
A predominant economic reason that patenting of life forms is resisted is the cost factor involved 
with patenting and the inability to see the financial return of such patent in the vast majority of 
cases. The reasons for economic resistance to patenting life forms – generating investment, 
freedom to operate, monopolistic opportunities and return on investment – are open to debate 
and are supported based on varying perspectives of the participants in the discussion; however, 
the reasons are present and do create economic resistance. As contentious as the arguments on 
economic resistance can be, a more intense debate ensues when the reasons for social resistance 
are discussed. 
 
3.4 Market 
The delivery of health care is facing numerous challenges and the issue of human gene patenting 
and its potential to affect the delivery of health care services will continue to increase as the level 
of human gene research advances. As researchers apply for patents on human genetic discoveries 
and innovations regarding disease research, the potential exists that IPRs could impede the 
delivery of healthcare services or other researchers' ability to undertake research in the same or a 
related field. A study of patents on human genes examined 74 human gene patents and found 
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there were 1,167 claims resulting from those patents (Paradise et al., 2005). Multiple patent 
claims have the potential to increase the complexity and difficulty of freedom to operate related 
to gene disease research. 
 
Research regarding the level of human gene patents would appear to vary, but a study by Jensen 
and Murray (2005) indicates that nearly 20% of human genes had been claimed by then in US 
patents. The authors had identified that 4,270 gene patents (containing 4,382 claims) existed 
within the National Center for Biotechnology Information database. The authors make an 
important observation in their article in that the number of gene sequences that have been 
explicitly claimed (4,382) is much different from the number of gene sequences that have been 
merely disclosed, which the authors estimate could be as high as 10 for every one patented. One 
important observation in this article is that nearly two-thirds (63%) of the human gene patents 
that have been assigned, have been assigned to private firms.  
 
While the amount of peer reviewed research is scarce on this topic, initial studies would suggest 
that there is a correlation between human gene patents and the ability to overcome some 
challenges in the delivery of health care services. Merz et al., (2002) report a 30% decline in 
genetic testing for haemochromatosis after patents for this test were awarded. Cho et al., (2003) 
surveyed clinical laboratory directors in the US and found that 53% decided not to develop new 
clinical genetic tests because of patent concerns. Additionally, the survey found that clinical 
geneticists believed that their research was inhibited by existing human gene patents.  
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From both the public and private perspectives, Caulfield (1998) argues that patenting is essential 
to fostering continued investment in research and the development of appropriate regulations in 
biotechnology. In the era of health care budget cuts and under-funding, public funding has been 
difficult to obtain, thereby increasing the opportunity for private entities to fund research 
initiatives. The health care market is an inefficient system and requires regulations within the 
system in order to provide the benefits of commercialization to government and society. 
 
Many have argued that Canada’s system is over-regulated and can be seen as prohibiting further 
development in biotechnology. For example, the enactment of Bill C-47, the Reproductive and 
Genetic Technologies Act is cited by Caulfield as an example of such over-regulation by 
restricting commercialization of genetics. Caulfield provides the consumer position on patent 
choice as restrictive when consumers perceive that their choices are being restricted by 
regulation.  
 
Restricted and timeliness of information flow is one concern outlined by Caulfield.  In order to 
facilitate the novelty of a patent, the information surrounding the patent must not be common 
knowledge. As such, new developments or findings regarding the effects of a medication, for 
example, may be held back from consumers in order to protect patentability. Contrastingly, 
researchers may jump too quickly to share information in order to capitalize in a dynamic 
market. This potentially results in dependence by consumers on a product where in-depth testing 
of such product may not have been completed sufficiently or the societal effects of widespread 
use of such a product have not been given proper consideration prior to commercialization.  
Caulfield uses the marketing of pre-disposition testing as an example, articulating the 
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dependency of consumers on the results of pre-disposition test results for Alzheimer’s and breast 
cancer. When these products were first introduced into the market, it was not with the 
consideration that the pre-disposition testing is a conclusive answer but is an aid used in 
diagnosis analysis with other variables. 
 
Consideration should also be given to the potential increase in health care costs as a result of 
additional testing that is available in an inefficient market. The market is considered inefficient 
because of the knowledge discrepancy between providers and consumers. As such, many 
consumers will perceive a ‘right’ and ‘need’ for products such as pre-disposition diagnostic or 
prenatal testing that could cause a further financial hardship on an already financially challenged 
system. Regulation regarding the definition of such need versus right to such products and 
services would assist in this regard. Such regulation should give consideration to who should pay 
for such products in a largely socialized system of health provision. 
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CHAPTER FOUR 
MYRIAD GENETICS 
 
4.1     Introduction 
The case of Myriad Genetics, headquartered in Utah, USA, and its patents on the BRCA1 and 
BRCA2 genes will be utilized to discuss patenting concerns, with specific consideration being 
given to the present patent system and the delivery of healthcare services. A comparison will 
then be made between the potential effects of the OECD Guidelines and the implementation 
options and the present Canadian intellectual property system, which must conform to the 
Canada Health Act. 
 
4.2 Enforcing Patent Rights 
In the spring of 2001, Myriad Genetics filed an exclusive patent application regarding testing for 
BRCA1 and BRCA2 breast cancer genes. At this time, four Canadian provinces used Myriad's 
genetic screening tests, Alberta, British Columbia (BC), Ontario and Quebec. Myriad sent letters 
to the Ministries of Health in each province informing the provinces that the firm now had patent 
rights to the genetic-sequencing tests: and that provincial testing programs would violate 
Myriad's patent. The provinces were informed that all samples should be sent to Utah and that 
the tests would be performed there for a per-test cost of C$3850 (Kent, 2001). This cost was 
more than triple what the provinces were spending at the time. Prior to the Myriad notice, the 
province of BC was spending C$1200 per test and Ontario was spending C$1150 (Eggertson, 
2002). Due in part, to this cost increase and legal advice, the BC Ministry of Health decided to 
suspend its screening program in July 2001.  
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This decision by the BC Ministry of Health resulted in 300 patient samples that were awaiting 
analysis being left with minimal options. The British Columbia Cancer Agency (BCCA) was the 
government body that conducted the test analysis, but it was taking, on average, 18 months to get 
the test results due to staffing shortages (Kent, 2001). Myriad was offering to provide test results 
in 6 weeks and it is estimated that six of the patients paid these costs out of their own pockets 
(Ibid.). After about 18 months with no testing in BC, the BCCA reached an agreement with the 
province of Ontario to have the tests analyzed in that province. Results of the tests took about six 
months through this arrangement. 
 
The Ontario government took a different approach to the letter received from Myriad. An 
assessment of the legal, ethical and financial implications was done and the government decided 
that the precedent that would be established was unsupportable and decided to continue 
screening programs. The then Minister of Health for the Province of Ontario, Tony Clement, said 
that Ontario would continue funding existing programs through their regional genetics centers 
and that payment to hospitals for these services "… does not constitute infringement of any valid 
claim of Myriad's patent" (Eggertson, 2002: 494). Myriad questioned whether Canada would 
uphold biotechnology patents.  
 
The Alberta government also suspended its screening program to allow legal experts to assess 
the validity of the patent and its claims. After this assessment was done, the Alberta government 
resumed the screening programs that are funded through the Alberta Cancer Genetics Program. 
The Quebec government was the lone province that agreed to comply with Myriad's letter and 
sends all test samples to Utah for analysis. 
34 
 
 
The BC government's decision to comply with Myriad's request to suspend testing, ultimately 
supported the IP claims of Myriad. The government had the option of increasing the funding to 
cover the increased cost of the testing program but declined this option. William-Jones and 
Burgess (2004) suggest that this decision makes the BC provincial government complicit in 
discontinuing publicly funded health services. They argue that what this decision ultimately 
meant for women in BC was that the government "… engaged in de facto priority setting, 
placing IP protection ahead of equitable access and establishing two categories of patients, those 
who could and those who could not afford the test" (Ibid.:120). 
 
The Canadian context of the Myriad patents rights assertion presents an interesting dichotomy. 
One province (Quebec) complied with the firm's request and sent test samples to Myriad for 
analysis and funded the extra cost through its health care system. A second province (BC) 
complied, but in the opposite manner and halted its screening program, thereby denying this 
service to its population. Finally, two provinces ignored Myriad's intention to enforce its IP and 
continued with the screening programs already in existence. All of this has taken place within a 
system of nationally funded health care that operates pursuant to the Canada Health Act and is 
supposed to provide equal access of healthcare services to all Canadians.   
 
The decision of the provincial governments to stop offering BRCA gene testing through the 
publicly funded system has resulted in a decline in the number of genetic tests being performed 
on Canadian women. Preventative treatment opportunities were being lost as a result of the 
limitation on the performance of the number of predisposition tests for the BRCA genes. 
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Provision of healthcare services in Canada is primarily governed by the provinces however, the 
federal government regulates healthcare through its financial support by way of equalization 
payments and through the enforcement of the Canada Health Act.  The Canada Health Act 
(CHA) requires that all Canadian citizens receive equal access to healthcare notwithstanding 
one’s ability to pay for such services. A further cost to the government in the patenting of the 
BRCA genes resulted from the provincial governments being required to responded to Myriad’s 
cease and desist demand in offering the tests and the cost of the tests thereafter more than 
tripling. The perception exists that this is tantamount to contravening the CHA based on 
accessibility subject to ability to pay. It could also be perceived that the patent granted to Myriad 
is within the realm of privatized services which is mostly restricted through both provincial and 
federal legislation. 
 
Society and government pay the cost of restricted research and development into areas that could 
develop more economical testing methods. Monopoly rights granted to Myriad with its patents 
on the BRCA genes restricts any competitors from attempting to develop a ‘spin-off’ test as a 
result of the non-substitutable good available for a gene sequence. Any attempt to develop a 
spin-off would result in infringement and possible litigation related to the product based claim. 
 
Clearly, Myriad's Canadian patent affected the delivery of healthcare services in Canada. While 
most of these effects were short term, until provincial governments were able to review and 
solicit expert legal opinions, at the extreme, the province of BC had no screening program 
operating for nearly two years. Additionally, it is impossible to discern how this patent 
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enforcement has affected any of the six provinces that do not presently offer screening programs 
but are considering developing such programs. 
 
While it may be expected that Myriad would have turned to the courts to protect their IP in 
Canada, this did not happen. Myriad's BRCA1 and BRCA2 genetic tests are but one option for 
women to be tested for hereditary disposition of breast cancer. The province of Ontario's defiant 
response to Myriad's letter may have been more for political gamesmanship than anything as the 
province rapidly moved to adopting an alternative test. Beginning in 2003, the province began 
testing with denaturing high-performance liquid chromatography. The provinces of Alberta and 
BC also sought alternative tests and BC once again offers its own testing program. 
 
Monopolistic behaviour was practiced by Myriad Genetics in the enforcement of their patent 
rights on genetic testing methods for the presence of the BRCA 1 and 2 used in identifying a 
patient’s predisposition for breast and ovarian cancer.  Myriad’s patent enforcement resulted in 
higher prices for the tests and greater profits to Myriad – and less testing being done on women 
who met the testing criteria and an increase in diagnostic waiting lists.  However, without doing 
a detailed calculation of the numbers but through a theoretical evaluation, it would appear that 
Myriad did not maximize its profitability as a lower price would have seen a higher number of 
tests being conducted and therefore more revenue being generated. The return on investment that 
could have been obtained by Myriad and the debate surrounding same can potentially be 
attributable to poor business decisions as opposed to patenting policies. 
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CHAPTER FIVE 
OECD GUIDELINES 
5.1    Introduction 
The OECD determined that the IP system as it relates to biotechnology and genetic inventions 
largely serves its purpose. However, the OECD goes on to state that there are issues and 
concerns within the system that need to be addressed and have therefore produced their 
Guidelines for Licensing Genetic Inventions. The Guidelines contain principles and best 
practices for licensing generally, healthcare and genetic inventions, research freedom, 
commercial development and competition. Within the scope of these headings we see the OECD 
focusing on the concerns outlined above as relevant to the Canadian intellectual property system. 
 
5.2 Article 1 – Licensing Generally 
The OECD’s general licensing principles and best practices are formulated to make available 
genetic inventions on a reasonable basis (free or at cost preferred), to stimulate research, to 
balance the interests of both the licensee and the licensor and to provide licensors with the 
licensing process to overcome freedom-to-operate issues. The OECD Principles and Best 
Practices state that licensing of genetic inventions should: 
i) promote further genetics research by permitting licensees to improve existing genetic 
inventions; 
ii) make readily available the products and/or services using genetic inventions by having 
patentees or licensors agree to terms that will maximize the use of the genetic invention; 
38 
 
iii) promote efficient and effective communication of information on genetic inventions by 
having clearly defined ownership, enforcement and collaborative rights and responsibilities; 
and 
iv) provide return on investment opportunities by clearly defining the roles and responsibilities 
of the parties relative to the commercialization of the product or service arising from the 
genetic invention. 
 
5.3 Article 2 – Healthcare and Genetic Inventions 
Access to existing research and recognition of the need for a balance between return on 
investment and need for the innovation are applicable concerns. As well, timeliness, options for 
products and services and addressing unmet and urgent health needs were a focus of the OECD 
in creating the Principles and Best Practices for Healthcare and Genetic Inventions. This section 
of the Guidelines states that licensing practices should: 
i) give a balance of consideration between delivery of innovations, healthcare needs and 
economic returns by utilizing strategic broad licensing practices; 
ii) protect patient confidentiality to the highest possible standards by strict compliance with 
applicable laws and regulations; 
iii) not restrict alternative product options to patients by permitting healthcare providers to offer 
alternative product or service options to their patients; and 
iv) encourage the use of and provide access to genetic innovations to enhance healthcare 
services and the deliverance of same by utilizing broad licensing terms and exploring 
opportunities to license genetic inventions in other jurisdictions. 
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5.4 Article 3 – Research Freedom 
Research freedom deals with the concern of stifled research, establishes licensing practices 
geared towards increasing access to inventions and not restricting educational training nor a 
researchers ability to publish in a timely fashion. Specifically, the Principles and Best Practices 
contained in the Research Freedom section of the Guidelines state that licensing practices 
should: 
i) increase access to genetic inventions for research purposes; 
ii) give consideration to commercialization requirements but should not obstruct research 
freedom nor restrict educational opportunities for students relative to genetic inventions; and 
iii) give consideration to the requirement of non-disclosure pursuant to the Patent Act in defining 
patentability but should not unreasonably delay dissemination or publication of information 
obtained through research. 
 
Each of these principles is suggested in the Guidelines to be practiced through education and 
clear communication of the responsibilities and requirements of confidentiality obligations for 
patentability together and with narrow licensing terms relative to confidentiality whenever 
possible and, specifically, should not restrict the disclosure of information in a timely fashion in 
public health situations. 
 
5.5 Article 4 – Commercial Development 
The Commercial Development section of the OECD Guidelines suggest that licensing principles 
should: 
i) provide broad access to genetic inventions; 
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ii) be used to provide opportunities to develop new products and services from a genetic 
invention; and 
iii) focus on coordination efforts for negotiating authorization of multiple genetic inventions 
required to further research. 
 
The Guidelines suggest that the best practices for commercial development in licensing of 
genetic inventions include encompassing a single royalty payment with negotiating access to 
multiple genetic inventions and creating a realm of lower access barriers with no reach through 
rights for licensors. 
 
5.6 Article 5 – Competition 
The Guidelines suggest that licensing practices relevant to competition should: 
i) encourage and promote economic growth through competition by not unreasonably restricted 
selling; and 
ii) not be used to expand the exclusivity of intellectual property rights provided through the 
intellectual property system through avoidance of unduly restrictive non-compete clauses in a 
license agreement and utilizing non-exclusive agreements whenever feasible. 
 
The following Section provides a comparison of the OECD Guidelines with the Canada Health 
Act and the Patent Act. This analytical component of the thesis connects the document and 
allows for an assessment of how the OECD Guidelines might have been used or interpreted 
during the Myriad issue. 
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CHAPTER SIX 
ANALYSIS AND DISCUSSION 
6.1     Introduction 
Fundamentally, the Canada Health Act and the Patent Act deal with two differing aspects of 
Canadian society. The Canada Health Act has been created to “establish criteria and conditions 
in respect of insured health services” that are delivered in each of the Canadian provinces. The 
Patent Act was established to create the rules and regulations of patent rights within the 
Canadian intellectual property system to aid in the positive progress in research and 
commercialization of innovations. These two statutes converge when research and innovations 
are done in the areas of healthcare and biotechnology, which includes genetic innovations.   
 
6.2   Methodological Assessment 
Table 6.1 compares the five articles of the OECD Guidelines against the three fundamental 
components of the model in Chapter Three: legal; economic; and market. As above, the three 
important aspects of the Canada Health Act relevant to this research are assessed: 
competitiveness (C); universality (U); and accessibility (A). 
 
Table 6.1:  Guidelines and the Issues 
 
Applicable 
Guideline 
Legal Issues Economic Issues Market Issues 
C U A C U A C U A 
1 √  √  √  √   
2  √ √ √  √ √ √  
3  √       √ 
4 √  √ √  √ √  √ 
5 √   √ √ √  √  
≈ shaded cells are not applicable 
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6.2.1  Legal Issues 
The requirements within the CHA are such that healthcare services be provided on a non-profit 
basis and that the provinces align the provision of those services according to the five criteria 
stated within the Act in order to receive federal financial support pursuant to the Act. Given this 
premise of the public healthcare system in Canada, the return on investment initiatives used to 
promote the intellectual property system and specifically patents creates a conflict. The political 
debate regarding private versus public healthcare is illustrated in these conflicting terms within 
these two Acts. It is arguable that the Patent Act by its very nature in attempting to garner returns 
and foster further research supports the advancement of a private healthcare system while the 
Canada Health Act impedes that development with its requirement that healthcare services be 
provided on a non-profit basis. The Canada Health Act does not allow for profitability in the 
delivery of healthcare services and the Patent Act attempts to provide the opportunity for exactly 
that return on patentable subject matter and does not restrict such subject matter from being 
within the definition of healthcare or healthcare services.   
 
There does not appear to be any significant conflict between these two statutes in Canada.  What 
is important to note, however, is that the Canadian healthcare system is in need of reform and is 
financially unsupportable as it is currently presented to the Canadian society (Romanow, 2002).  
It does appear that the terms of the Patent Act and the rights and privileges granted under same 
could be utilized to ease the burden on the healthcare system should it be seen that a return on 
investment is acceptable in the healthcare industry thereby encouraging private investment in the 
industry. While the Patent Act provides an avenue for government intervention to obtain use of a 
patent for what could be argued as healthcare purposes, utilization of such opportunity would be 
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contradictory to the benefits that are afforded under the Patent Act itself and may have a 
political/societal backlash. 
 
6.2.2 Economic Issues 
There have been numerous assertions that patents are essential to private R&D, yet this is 
increasingly being contested.  A large share (some argue most) of the inventions that eventually 
enter the market come from non-commercial programs (e.g. drugs). Whether or not patents are 
necessary for invention, there is probably a stronger argument that private investment in 
commercialization may require patents (or some other way to control access to products).  The 
SCC decision in Harvard v. Commissioner of Patents rejected patents on higher life forms.  
This puts Canada at odds with most other competing countries. Some have argued this would 
encourage some types of research in Canada, while others have argued it would chill R&D in 
Canada. So far the evidence supports neither hypothesis. It may be that because patents are only 
one form of protection, other forms have simply backfilled and protected the IP.  
 
While there appears to be some evidence of blocking patents in some of the pharmaceutical 
research areas, there is little or no evidence of what impact those blocking patents have on R&D. 
There may be a case that Myriad’s technology restricts and stops research in their field, but a 
research exemption does not necessarily help. The problem is that if the research exemption is 
used to develop a commercial technology or product, the inventor is actually putting themselves 
into a poor position. Research exemptions do not provide any means of negotiating a contract 
and leaves them open to stranding all of their sunk investments. A better model (which the public 
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could support) would be for researchers to request research licenses (which often have provisions 
for negotiating subsequent operational licenses.  
 
Private-public partnerships have been shown to increase the efficiency of research and 
development as well as the rate of commercialization of innovations (Fuglie, 1996).  Such 
partnerships are also utilized in an effort to address the economic issues associated with 
patenting and research and development. 
 
6.2.3 Market Issues 
There is no doubt that patents are a second best instrument. Through patents, trade secrets, 
trademarks, copyright and plant breeders’ rights, we give inventors the right to exclude others 
from using their ideas without compensation. This allows them to act like monopolists, and 
reduce the amount of the product they supply to the market. This rationing of supply forces the 
price higher, allowing the inventors to recoup their investment.  The underlying implication is 
that the inventor chooses to restrict supply, meaning that those demanding the product would pay 
more to purchase the product and as a result, the inventor now is able to earn a substantial profit.   
  
It is uncertain whether Myriad is acting as a full economic actor. Myriad earned just over $US11 
million in research revenues in 2004 (Myriad, 2004).  Thus, they were only paid for about 4000 
tests.  If the public health officials are being honest about their efforts, they suggest they would 
apply the tests to maybe 20% of the adult female population, which creates a potential market in 
North America of 30 million. It would appear that Myriad is not optimizing its profits as its price 
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is not at the point where marginal cost equals marginal revenue. Hence, some patent problems 
are not due to the patents, but due to poor commercial practice. 
 
Compulsory licensing, if it had been in effect during the time of Myriad, would have provided 
for mandatory licensing being provided to the provinces at a pre-determined price governed by 
legislation or a form of binding arbitration.  Such price would then be based on market factors 
thereby potentially enhancing the commercial practice results obtained by Myriad. 
 
6.3 Implementation Assessment – Guidelines and Options 
Table 6.2 provides the framework to assess the key OECD articles against the several 
implementation options that are presented: hard law; soft law; educational; and institutional. 
 
Table 6.2:  Guidelines and the Implementation Options 
 
Applicable 
Guideline Hard Law Soft Law Educational Institutional 
1 √  √ √ 
2  √ √ √ 
3 √ √  √ 
4     
5 √ √ √ √ 
≈ shaded cells are not applicable 
 
6.3.1 Hard Law 
The hard law approach to implementation of the Guidelines will make the Guidelines legally 
binding on licensees and licensors and would require actual amendments to and/or interpretation 
of relevant legislations, specifically the Competition Act and the Patent Act. The Health Canada 
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Symposium on Human Genetics Licensing presented three opportunities for hard law 
implementation. 
 
Section 5 of the Guidelines dealing with competition could be implemented through actual 
amendment of Section 65 of the Patent Act and through altering the judicial interpretation of 
Section 35 of the Competition Act which deals with anti-competitiveness. Section 35 of the 
Competition Act is broad in its terms thereby allowing for revision in interpretation merely 
requiring that judges consider the Guidelines when applying the section. 
 
Access to genetic inventions is discussed and addressed in Section 2 of the Guidelines and can be 
dealt with through invoking use of the compulsory licensing provisions contained in Section 19 
of the Patent Act. Alternatively, an amendment to the Patent Act enacting specific licensing 
provisions for genetic inventions would address this concern. The enactment of such an 
amendment could potentially create a realm of industry compliance to avoid use of the provision 
itself (Gold, 2006). The Canadian Biotechnology Advisory Committee also recommended this 
amendment to the Patent Act. 
 
Finally, an amendment to the Patent Act through the enactment of a statutory research exemption 
would serve to implement Section 3 of the Guidelines dealing with Research Freedom. Dr. 
Arnold Naimark, Chair of the Canadian Biotechnology Advisory Committee, stated that the 
Canadian Intellectual Property Office (CIPO) provided little resistance to amending the Patent 
Act and the Competition Act as the amendments would provide clarity of sections of the Acts and 
not removal of sections or completely redrafting the Acts (Naimark, 2006). 
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6.3.2 Soft Law 
Soft law or self-regulating options include adoption of the Guidelines as industry standards for 
both public and private institutions specifically requiring compliance with the Guidelines as a 
criterion for funding. From a public institution approach, research ethics boards could give 
consideration to the Guidelines as being a required part of a research proposal. As well, 
universities could either strongly encourage the use of the Guidelines or adopt them as 
compulsory for all of its researchers. From private industry, adoption of the Guidelines by 
industry groups as being compulsory for its members is an implementation option. A major 
group that could affect this type of implementation is BIOTECanada (Gold, 2006).   
 
6.3.3 Educational 
In his presentation to the Health Canada Symposium, Stuart Howe, Director, The Hospital for 
Sick Children, stated that the Guidelines, by way of principle, are already in effect in most 
technology transfer offices (Howe, 2006). Gold however states that this is not the case and 
opines that further education and training on intellectual property and its management would be 
appropriate in implementing the OECD Guidelines (Gold, 2006). 
 
The educational approach to implementing the OECD Guidelines involves educating both 
licensees and licensors on the Guidelines and their ultimate purpose. For the full understanding 
to take place most licensees and licensors will require a more in depth knowledge of intellectual 
property and intellectual property management itself (Gold, 2006).  Gold suggests that changing 
the measurement tool utilized in assessing patentability would be beneficial in this regard.  
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Specifically, Gold recommends placing more weight on the dissemination of information thereby 
netting in more non-exclusive licensing and broader access to patents. Implementation of 
intellectual property management as a section of management courses is a further option (Gold, 
2006). 
 
6.3.4 Institutional 
Patent pools and clearinghouses are institutions that would implement the Best Practices 
contained in the Guidelines could be created in Canada and more specifically in the 
biotechnology industry as an implementation option. These institutions operate based on the 
concept of ‘open source’. Open source is defined as a specialized licensing arrangement where 
the products or patents are contained in a commons and any improvements or advancements 
made thereto are returned to the commons and available for use to its members (Castle, 2006). 
Castle stated in his presentation to the Health Canada Symposium that open source is a solution 
that “does not require direct reform of patent legislation, but instead works on the basis of 
changed licensing practices.” When applied to the biotechnology industry, Castle stated that 
open source will allow innovations to occur quicker with broader access to and greater 
dissemination of information. A reduction in licensing costs is a main motivator towards the use 
of open source. Reduction in licensing costs for researchers provides a greater avenue for 
accessing information. Any reduction in licensing revenues to firms is often considered to be 
offset by the benefits of faster, more economical technological advancements experienced in an 
open source regime. In addition, Shapiro (2001) states that firms may choose to participate in an 
open source system as the concerns surrounding freedom to operate are addressed and litigation 
issues are minimized resulting in increased efficiencies with an enhanced innovation process.  
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Castle (2006) suggests that government intervention may also be required to facilitate the 
implementation and initial success of an open source system.  Such intervention may come in the 
form of funding and support for a business model to mitigate the effects of the time lag 
associated with changing the system. 
 
A patent pool is an arrangement within which patent owners license their patents to others. 
Within a patent pool, licensees have access to the technology that is the subject matter of a patent 
and any enhancements made thereto. Of the differing types of open sourcing, Castle stated that 
patent pools are the most favored in the biotechnology industry however they are not without 
their challenges. Castle further articulates that patent pools are considered to enhance 
competition and to motivate future innovations by integrating complementary technologies, 
clearing blocking positions, reducing licensing costs, minimizing infringement litigation and 
increasing the dissemination of technologies. 
 
Patent exclusivity and patent stacking are two of the main concerns associated with patent pools.  
Patent exclusivity is when a patent owner utilizes their exclusivity rights and restricts the use of 
the subject matter of their patent by others (Ebersole, 2005). Patent stacking is a situation that 
occurs when multiple licenses are required in order to conduct further research or 
commercialization (Ibid.). Castle outlines a few concerns with patent pools specific to 
biotechnology stating that patent pools constitute a method of price fixing and excludes 
competitors from the market, reduces opportunity for further research and development and 
unnecessarily inflates the price of competitively priced goods. In his presentation at Health 
Canada’s Symposium on Human Genetics Licensing, James Simon, who works with ViroNative 
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BV & CoroNovative BV in the Netherlands, stated that patent pools are most effective if created 
in a cooperative manner and if the pool is organized by “type” citing examples such as the DVD 
and MPEG patent pools (Simon, 2006). 
 
Clearinghouses for patent pools are contrived to be similar to that of clearinghouses in the 
financial market in that all of the processes associated with a patent transaction would be 
required to go through the clearinghouse.  Dianne Nicol, Senior Lecturer with the Centre for Law 
and Genetics at the University of Tasmania in Australia, presented to the Symposium her 
thoughts on clearinghouses and defined three types of exchanges that would be facilitated 
through a patent clearinghouse:  information exchange; technology exchange; and intellectual 
property exchange (Nicol, 2006). Nicol envisions a clearinghouse that provides a database of 
patents which patent offices would feed into and access information from and a venue from 
which royalties would be both collected and disseminated. 
 
6.4  Implementation Assessment – Options and Issues 
Potential areas of conflict have been illustrated between the Canada Health Act and the Patent 
Act of Canada.  In an attempt to address and manage the areas of conflict and build a bridge over 
the gaps existing between the Acts while preserving the intent of both Acts, the OECD has 
provided its “Guidelines of Licensing of Genetic Inventions” and suggestions for their 
implementation.  
 
The Myriad Genetics case assists in identifying the policy issues arising from the contrary 
provisions in the Acts and the potential gaps that exist between the Acts.  From there a 
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comparison has been provided in Table 6.1 between the Guidelines presented by the OECD and 
the policy issues identified using the Canada Health Act as a basis for comparison.  Table 6.2 
summarizes the Guidelines and the implementation options presented by the OECD.  The 
question then becomes whether or not there is an implementation option that would have an 
optimal impact on the policy issues.  Table 6.3 contains a matrix comparing the implementation 
options as outlined in Section 6.3 and the policy issues identified in Chapter 3.   
 
Table 6.3:  Implementation Options and the Issues 
 
Implementation 
Option Legal Economic Market 
Hard Law 1 2 1 
Soft Law 1 or 2 2 1 
Educational 3 1 2 
Institutional 2 2 2 
 
Table 6.3 Key: 1 – Optimal; 2 – Sub-optimal; 3 – Not Optimal 
 
The analysis done to create Table 6.3 is based on whether or not and how much of a positive 
impact would be seen using each implementation option.   
 
The hard law option or changes to the Acts is, overall, an optimal option to provide a positive 
change to addressing the policy issues.  Legislation dictating the requirements and conformance 
around implementation and use of the guidelines will provide firm, concise direction for users 
and researchers.  Repercussions associated with contravention to the legislation would be clearly 
articulated and therefore the system well regulated. 
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Soft law implementation of the guidelines would eliminate the bureaucracy and time required for 
implementation when compared to the governmental process required to be followed to amend 
legislation in Canada and would require that those wishing to research in this discipline do so 
within the auspice of the guidelines.  This approach has potential to result in all actors accepting 
and utilizing the guidelines through a natural evolution. 
 
Education about the patent system and working within it, as well as the guidelines and their 
purpose, is the third most optimal option for implementing the guidelines. This option requires 
that all researchers and users within the system work with the best interests and intents of the 
patent system in mind and keep the focus of future and furthered research and development 
paramount.  It leaves use of the guidelines as optional and assumes that once a person is educated 
he or she will reach the same position as all others.  Educating firms regarding market pricing 
strategies, the potential benefits to allowing use of innovations at reasonable costs and the use 
private-public partnerships would also be required.  This would assist firms in maximizing their 
commercialization success and returns on investments, 
 
The institutional approach is the least optimal overall as it requires that researchers, at least on 
some level, relinquish their opportunity to recover costs associated with research and 
development but also the ability to make a profit off of their efforts. 
 
The positive impact analysis done in Table 6.3 does not take into consideration the feasibility of 
utilizing that implementation. External factors that affect feasibility of an option include 
bureaucracy and process associated with utilizing that option, the length of time it would take to 
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enact the option and the length of time it would take before seeing the impact on the issue.  Table 
6.4 revisits Table 6.3 with these considerations in mind. 
 
Table 6.4:  Implementation Options and the Issues Based on Feasibility 
 
Implementation 
Option Legal Economic Market 
Hard Law 3 3 3 
Soft Law 1 or 2 2 1 
Educational 3 1 2 
Institutional 2 2 2 
 
Table 6.4 Key: 1 – Optimal; 2 – Sub-optimal; 3 – Not Optimal 
 
The hard law option would take the longest period of time to implement.  Changes to legislation 
require parliamentary participation which is often dependent upon external factors such as the 
political party in power at the time, the economy and special interest groups.  These factors may 
change over the period of time from when a bill is introduced for such amendments to when it is 
enacted.   
 
Initiating the soft law, education and institutional implementation options requires less “red tape” 
and bureaucracy when compared to the hard law option.  The soft law approach encapsulates 
amendments to processes, procedures and regulations within institutions and boards.  Once 
adopted, these guidelines are immediately available for use and to affect change.  The 
uncertainty in the market for use of patent pool and clearinghouses reduces the optimization level 
of the institutional option. 
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Consideration of feasibility for implementation causes a change in the optimizing position of the 
options concluding with the soft law approach as the most optimal followed by educational and 
finally institutional. 
 
A soft law approach to implementing the guidelines requires that standards be set for use by 
various institutions and funding agencies.  Such standards would be best developed through a 
collaborative effort of the institutions and funding agencies that would be measuring if the 
standards have been met by approving funding, accepting applications and so forth.  Some such 
entities are:  BIOTECanada, Genome Canada and Health Canada. 
 
The purpose of the guidelines is to bridge the gaps present with research, patenting and 
commercializing of genetic innovations and to assist in addressing some of the challenges of the 
health care system in Canada, including fiscal sustainability; specifically, to address the gaps 
between the Patent Act and the Canada Health Act.  Implementation of the guidelines through 
soft law methods will allow for furtherance of research and development of genetic innovations 
for use in the Canadian health care system while providing a healthy derivative of the economic 
benefits of securing patent rights.  This should provide for enhanced health care options to the 
average Canadian at more reasonable costs. 
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CHAPTER SEVEN 
CONCLUSIONS 
 
7.1     Summary of Results 
The dilemma within Canada regarding the challenges between the objectives of the Patent Act 
and the Canada Health Act exist because the Patent Act provides for profit opportunities on 
genetic innovations while the Canada Health Act is a not-for-profit system. The Canadian 
healthcare system and the delivery of services are based on innovative technologies for which 
firms and investors expect a return on their investment.  
 
It can be argued that the contrast between the Acts is reduced with the presence and use of 
Section 19 of the Patent Act which provides an avenue for either a federal or provincial 
government to obtain authorization to use a patent under certain criteria. This section would have 
allowed for provincial governments to make more of an effort through negotiations with Myriad 
Genetics to acquire the use of Myriad’s patent on the BRCA1 and BRCA2 diagnostic testing 
processes. Failing such effort, the provinces could then have sought for authorization pursuant to 
Section 19 of the Patent Act thereafter supplying the domestic market with the product and 
compensating Myriad for its use on fair economic terms based on the market. Going one step 
further, however, the provinces could even have sought to seek use of the patents under the 
exception stated in Section 19 that the use is for public non-profit purposes. It would seem 
however that the precedent set by invoking such use of this Section would have a seriously 
negative effect on research and development initiatives and investments in the healthcare 
industry and genetics. Use of such right under the Patent Act, while fitting within the scope of 
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non-profit basis requirements of the Canada Health Act, would mitigate some of the rights 
afforded to a patentee under the Patent Act.   
 
Outside of the scope of the return on investment in genetics research relative to the provision of 
healthcare in Canada and the debate on private versus public healthcare, there appears to be no 
real conflict between the Canada Health Act and the Patent Act. However, there are concerns 
that the intellectual property system is lacking as it pertains to biotechnology and genetics 
research. Such concerns discussed herein and addressed in the OECD’s Guidelines for Licensing 
Genetic Innovations are freedom to operate, return on investment, timely access to information, 
monopolistic opportunities and nurturing future research. It is the choice of policy instrument for 
implementation of these Guidelines in Canada that will determine if these concerns are actually 
addressed and whether or not conflict is created between the intellectual property system and the 
healthcare system in Canada. Options for implementation include a hard law approach requiring 
amendments to the Patent Act or the Competition Act, a soft law approach making it compulsory 
for both public and private institutions and funding agencies to adhere to the terms and best 
practices set forth in the guidelines, an institutional approach seeing the creation of such entities 
as patent pools and clearinghouses and an education approach seeing the enhancement of 
knowledge and courses on intellectual property and intellectual property management for both 
researchers and institution management. 
 
The question yet unanswered is: What is the best implementation approach for Canada giving 
appropriate consideration to the purpose of the Canadian healthcare system and the present 
intellectual property system? 
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Notwithstanding CIPO’s response that amendments to the Act as would be required by the 
Guidelines are not considered revolutionary in nature, the hard law approach to implementing the 
Guidelines would in fact be an onerous approach requiring government intervention and may be 
too time consuming to serve the purposes of the Guidelines themselves. Clarity and application 
of both the Patent Act and the Competition Act can be obtained through knowledge and 
understanding of the Guidelines and their purpose and thereafter the adjudication of judges and 
patent officers. As such, the soft law approach appears to be the most viable option for 
implementation of the Guidelines in Canada with a hybrid approach giving consideration to the 
educational approach, as it is required to affect the soft law approach. It is the practices within 
the industry, by both licensors and licensees that are required to facilitate the change required to 
appropriately address the concerns of the intellectual property system relative to biotechnology 
and genetic inventions. The soft law approach takes the responsibility directly to the players in 
the industry itself providing a more time efficient method of implementing the practices and 
affecting change within the system itself. The educational approach is required to educate judges, 
patent officers, researchers and management of the Guidelines, their purpose, and the best 
practices for obtaining the desired goals. There may be a place in the Canadian intellectual 
property system for patent pools and clearinghouses – the institutional approach. However it 
would appear that these two entities would fare better with government intervention and perhaps 
additional or amending regulations. At this time, it would seem that the institutional approach 
would not have the buy-in that is required by the industry itself to be successful. The Canada 
Health Act and the Patent Act can remain unchanged and the concerns of the intellectual 
property system largely addressed by the implementation of the Guidelines utilizing the soft law 
and educational approaches. 
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7.2     Limitations 
The lack of other examples that would provide additional insights or for comparative purposes 
can be seen as a limitation. The unavailability of additional data or information has resulted in 
the above being more of a case study than a research venture that could compare and contrast 
various scenarios and thus provide observations or recommendations with an enhanced level of 
value. As with any aspect of research regarding innovation, products or processes, one must 
expect a certain absence of information, data and/or knowledge, but that is the price that one 
must pay when engaging in research of this nature. 
 
7.3     Extensions 
As above, a natural extension of this research would be to examine similar cases in the health 
sector that could provide further, detailed insights and knowledge. As genomic research 
advances, so to, will challenging issues such as this. As was observed earlier, the number of 
patents on human genes has increased rapidly and as innovative research is undertaken involving 
the genomic makeup of human diseases and their potential treatments, a logical outcome of this 
is an increase in situations such as the one examined within the confines of this research. With 
the OECD Guidelines having been in place now for a few years, an assessment of their 
effectiveness would certainly be timely. 
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